The Iraq that Khalilzad leaves behind (to take up a post as the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations) is a fundamentally different place than the one he parachuted into in the summer of 2005. Then, Khalilzad was hailed as a possible savior–the strong-arming diplomat that could put the U.S. back on track in Iraq. He had spent the previous 18 months wrangling with warlords in Afghanistan, where he was born, so it didn’t seem that far-fetched. Unlike his predecessor, the inscrutable John Negroponte, Khalilzad could do finesse, or so went the conventional wisdom at the time. It didn’t hurt that he’s a Muslim who speaks fluent Arabic. So little surprise that he was feted like a rock star when he arrived: a reception was held in an opulent building near Saddam Hussein’s former palace in Baghdad and journalists were plied with wine and finger snacks.

All that was before the attack on the Askariya shrine in Samarra in February last year. Before dozens of handcuffed bodies were dumped around Baghdad everyday. Before Iraqi politicians had sectarian shouting matches in the parliament. The attack on the shrine, which is one of the holiest sites for Shiites, was the turning point in Iraq’s civil war and Khalilzad was stuck in the middle. As these sectarian divisions increased in the past year, Khalilzad often pressured Shiite politicians to be more inclusive toward their Sunni counterparts. In fact, Khalilzad confirmed in the presser today that he had even met with Sunni insurgent representatives “on several occasions” to draw them into the fold. The goal of these talks was to drive a wedge between the “reconcilable” insurgents and Al Qaeda fanatics. “One of the challenges is how to separate more and more groups away from Al Qaeda,” he said. “How to turn them to cooperate with the Iraqi government against Al Qaeda. That is a strategic, important objective.” He admitted that the talks had only been marginally successful. Some Shiites have accused Khalilzad, who is Sunni, of being biased and took to calling him “Abu Omar,” a Sunni nickname.

Still, Khalilzad isn’t as widely reviled among Iraqis as America’s first proconsul Paul Bremer, who left Iraq hastily and with few friends. Khalilzad’s replacement, Ryan Crocker, is an old Middle East hand, but he too will be faced with the nearly impossible task of negotiating with notoriously difficult Iraqi politicians and dealing with the increasing unpopularity of the war back home. Khalilzad touched on this point today. He said, “I constantly signal to the Iraqi leaders that our patience, or the patience of the American people, is running out.”