Chen’s–and the DPP’s–historic accomplishment, therefore, generates considerable nervousness among those wed to the status quo. Beijing fears the DPP will accelerate Taiwan’s drift from the mainland, culminating in Taipei’s international acceptance as a permanently separate nation. China’s leaders blame the United States for enabling the process. They have warned Taiwan that a declaration of independence would trigger an attack.
A mainland assault against Taiwan would inevitably draw in the United States. How could a Sino-American war start? Through Beijing’s miscalculations about American resolve to assist Taiwan in case of an attack–or missteps by a new Taipei administration that erroneously concludes it enjoys unlimited American support. Even limited Chinese military action–such as seizure of Taiwanese ships in the strait or of lightly defended islands–would spark some sort of American assistance to Taiwan. The unpredictable dynamics of escalation would be unleashed. While the United States would prevail, the cost to the United States would be enormous, and to China even more so. In the process, the prosperous and democratic Taiwan of today would be destroyed.
But Beijing, Taipei and Washington can avoid such a calamity if each demonstrates calmness and restraint. For starters, Beijing would be wise to recognize the opportunities Chen’s ascent could represent: an end to the protracted KMT-communist civil war and the beginning of an expansion of cross-strait relations in such areas as telecommunications, shipping and aviation. Chen has endorsed such links. Further, Beijing could test Chen’s intentions by proclaiming a moratorium on its missile deployments across from Taiwan, in hopes Chen would respond by deferring interest in acquisition of theater missile-defense systems.
Chen has political capital to spend. His unassailable commitment to Taiwan’s autonomy may give him greater political flexibility to expand economic, cultural and technological relations. As that process unfolds, it may be possible to reach compromises on sensitive political issues. But he must discipline his rhetoric–such as how he refers to Taiwan’s status in world affairs. And he must select carefully a cabinet and advisers. Some of Chen’s DPP supporters have said Taiwan should acquire weapons of mass destruction; they seek a level of Taiwan-U.S. military cooperation that would destroy Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations. Inclusion of such people in the Chen administration would raise doubts about the new government’s judiciousness.
Washington and Tokyo have responsibilities as well. Taiwan’s successful and peaceful transfer of power merits great praise and support. But the embrace of Taiwan’s new administration should be tempered by Chen’s performance. Will his rhetoric, policies and appointments merit the external support that he needs? Rather than enacting the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, which mandates increased Taiwan-U.S. military cooperation, or deciding now to provide Taiwan with significant new weapons systems, Washington should first judge the disposition of its new partner.
At the same time, Washington and Tokyo must remove any doubts in Beijing about their commitment to Taiwan. The U.S. military posture in the western Pacific must remain robust. The United States and Japan should neither pressure Taiwan to enter into negotiations with Beijing nor so indulge Taipei that it feels no need to do so. The urge for dialogue must come from within.
Chen’s election has not altered the underlying strategic reality. The responsibility of the United States and Japan remains–to maintain a security architecture in the western Pacific that preserves stability and enables the mainland and Taiwan to expand their contacts without jeopardizing the security or affronting the dignity of either. How, when and at what pace they do so is their business–as long as they do it peacefully.
